Liberal Lease Interpretation Boosts Lagging Oklahoma Oil Production: Kuykendall v. Helmerich &(and) Payne, Inc. by Stewart, Beverly A.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 23 
Issue 4 Mineral Law Symposium 
Summer 1988 
Liberal Lease Interpretation Boosts Lagging Oklahoma Oil 
Production: Kuykendall v. Helmerich &(and) Payne, Inc. 
Beverly A. Stewart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Beverly A. Stewart, Liberal Lease Interpretation Boosts Lagging Oklahoma Oil Production: Kuykendall v. 
Helmerich &(and) Payne, Inc., 23 Tulsa L. J. 623 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss4/5 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
LIBERAL LEASE INTERPRETATION BOOSTS
LAGGING OKLAHOMA OIL PRODUCTION:
KUYKENDALL v. HELMERICH
& PA YNE, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, falling oil prices' have led to the decline of
Oklahoma's oil industry2 and the subsequent decline of the state's econ-
omy. With the decrease in exploratory drilling and the shut down of low
production wells,3 unemployment and bankruptcies are increasing in
Oklahoma and other oil producing states.4 As a result, workers migrat-
ing from Oklahoma left approximately 25,000 vacant homes in the state.5
To enhance oil and gas development in an uncertain economy, the
traditional approach of interpreting leases against the lessee6 is giving
way to more flexible lease interpretation.7 For example, in Kuykendall v.
1. The average price for Oklahoma crude oil in 1981 was $35.22 dropping to $28.46 in 1984.
Kinzie & Dancy, Protecting the Oil Field Creditor, 56 OKLA. B.J. 1203, 1209 n.1 (1985). Amid some
stabilization of falling oil prices in 1987, experts predict stabilization around the $16-418 per barrel
range in 1988. Pearson, Tulsans to Remember '87 as Year of'Slights,' Tulsa World, Jan. 3, 1988, at
A4, col. 6.
2. Falling 25 percent since mid-1986, Oklahoma oil production is expected to decline 15 per-
cent annually. In the past few years, wildcatting has declined 85 to 90 percent. In addition, while
drilling rigs in 1987 were slightly up from the 150 counted in 1986, the number is far from the June
1981 count of 882 drilling rigs. Tulsa World, supra note 1, at A4, col. 6. Oklahoma is fifth among oil
producing states. West, Good times and bad, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 17, 1987, at 13.
3. In Oklahoma, approximately eight of ten oil wells are classed as "stripper wells" averaging
production of 3.3 barrels of oil per day. Pearson, Production In Paying Quantities: A Review of
Oklahoma Law, 56 OKLA. B.J. 1189, 1189, 1193 n.2 (1985). The 270,359 barrels of oil produced
daily from 81,703 stripper wells in Oklahoma, represents approximately six of every ten barrels of oil
produced in Oklahoma. Id.
4. True, A year's tale, OIL & GAS J., July 13, 1987, at 13. American Petroleum Institute
statistics for 1986 show Louisiana led in unemployment with 13.1% of its population out of work
followed by Alaska, 10.8%, and Texas, 8.9%. Oil industry business failures, mainly in Texas, Loui-
siana, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, exploded by 59.9% in 1986. Bankruptcies in Oklahoma increased
by 55.9%. Id.
5. Oneok, Inc., Tulsa, serving most of Oklahoma, reports serving 6,400 fewer residential cus-
tomers in 1987 than in 1986. West, supra note 2, at 13.
6. Courts traditionally construe contracts against the drafter who is usually the lessee. Beatty
v. Baxter, 208 Okla. 686, 688, 258 P.2d 626, 628 (1953); Superior Oil & Gas Co. v. Mehlin, 25 Okla.
809, 817, 108 P. 545, 548 (1910).
7. Although there is some limited contrary authority, courts generally find commencement of
drilling where only the "most modest preparations for drilling have been made." 3 H. WILLIAMS,
OIL AND GAS LAW § 618.1 (1985).
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Helmerich & Payne, Inc.,8 the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the
lessee drilling company's rights although Helmerich & Payne (H&P) did
not strictly comply with the "commencement of drilling" clause in the
lease.
Flexible oil and gas lease interpretation evolved to the lessee's ad-
vantage through the addition of language varying the habendum clause9
and through modem spacing regulations.1" Addition of "commence-
ment of drilling" language significantly affected the habendum clause by
allowing commencement to suffice for production" thereby preventing
lease termination. Pooling and unitization, spacing regulations which
limited drilling to one well on a prescribed drilling unit, additionally
changed the habendum clause thereby liberalizing lease interpretation.12
The force majeure clause, 3 another significant habendum clause modifi-
cation, also prevents lease termination due to circumstances beyond the
lessee's control.
Thus, modem lease interpretation involves a multiplicity of factors.
Courts interpret lease language, including commencement of drilling, 4
pooling and unitization,' 5 and a force majeure clause, 6 in light of the
overriding objective to promote oil and gas development.' 7 Flexible in-
terpretation necessitates consideration of the good faith efforts of the
lessee to comply with lease provisions'8 and the equities affecting both
8. 741 P.2d 869 (Okla. 1987).
9. Early oil and gas lease habendum clauses provided for either a lengthy term of 40 to 99
years or a shorter definite primary term to be extended for an indefinite period of years by rental
payments. Production was not required. Starting in the early 1900's, leases contained a short pri-
mary term and a simple habendum clause providing for continuation so long as oil or gas was
produced. Meyers, Continuation of the Oil and Gas Lease Beyond Its Primary Term--Long May It
Waive, 4 E. MIN. L. INST. § 17.02, at 17-2-17-3 (1983).
10. Id. at 17-3-17-4.
11. Id. The "commencement ofdrilling" language first added to leases was typically worded as
follows:
This lease shall remain in force for a primary term of ten years, and if lessee shall coin-
mence to drill within said primary term, lessee shall have the right to continue drilling to
completion, and said term shall continue as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from
the leased premises.
Id. (emphasis original).
12. Id. at 17-3. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. Another significant change (ir-
relevant to this discussion) deals with the addition of "continuous operations" or "cessation of oper-
ations" language. 4 E. MIN. L. INST., supra note 9, at 17-3.
13. Id. at 17-4. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
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parties. 19 In fact, commentators find an evolving superstructure in cur-
rent oil and gas law based on rules of fairness and reasonableness2 °
rather than on straight contract law.21 Faced with the present oil indus-
try problems, mild judicial intervention by liberally interpreting com-
mencement of drilling language in an oil and gas lease could enhance
development efforts. During the energy crisis of the 1970's, mild judicial
coercion advanced Oklahoma's upsurge in oil and gas exploration.22
Therefore, when an oil producer, such as H&P, is making every effort to
explore and produce, and the lessor's property rights would not be ad-
versely affected, 3 pragmatism justifies flexible lease interpretation.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.,24 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court considered whether there was commencement of drilling
which extended the primary lease term. The Kuykendall lease contained
a five year primary term expiring December 20, 1976.25 On November
12, 1976, prior to acquiring the lease, H&P filed an application with the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the Commission) requesting en-
largement of its well spacing unit in section 7 to include the Kuykendall
lease.26 H&P acquired the lease by transfer on November 17, 1976. On
19. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
20. Polston, Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Law, 6 E. MIN. L. INST. § 19.01, at 19-2
(1985). Although most relationships are formed by documents which are tailored to fit the parties'
situations, the courts may disregard the document in favor of the relationship if the document oper-
ates unfairly against one party. Id.
21. Citing oil and gas law as an example of the trend toward the demise of contracts, Polston
claims that oil and gas law is based on relationships where status is more important than contract.
Id. at § 19.02[2], at 19-4.
22. Nesbitt, A Primer on Forced Pooling of Oil and Gas Interests in Oklahoma, 50 OKLA. B.J.
648 (1979) [hereinafter Primer on Forced Pooling]. Charles Nesbitt is a former Oklahoma Attorney
General and Corporation Commission member. Judicial enforcement of statutory forced pooling
contributed to the development of Oklahoma's implied covenant to explore. Pickerill, Is There a
New Implied Covenant of Explorvelopment?, 31 S.W. LEGAL FOUND. INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW &
TAX'N, 245, 278 (1980) (citing 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 845.5 (1985).
See J. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW 283 (1983). "The essential concept [of the implied covenant to
develop) is that the economically motivated prudent operator will freely develop resources under his
control within a reasonable time." Id.
23. Hair v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 740 P.2d 134, 140 (Okla. 1987) (claiming consistency
with the court's pronouncement earlier the same day in Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 741
P.2d 869 (Okla. 1987)).
24. 741 P.2d 869 (Okla. 1987).
25. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 870. The Kuykendalls leased their mineral interest in Grady
County, Oklahoma (section 7) to Taft Milford. If drilling commenced prior to the expiration date,
the lease could be extended indefinitely. Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 54 OKLA. B.J. 26
(January 8, 1983).
26. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 870. The enlargement encompassed the entire 640 acres of section
7. Id.
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December 3, 1976, H&P, as operator, commenced drilling the designated
unit well, the McClure No. 1, in the northeast quarter of section 7-
directly east of the Kuykendall quarter section.27 The trial examiner,
hearing the spacing application without contest on December 9, 1976,
recommended that it be granted. On December 21, 1976, one day fol-
lowing the expiration date of the lease, the Commission established all of
section 7 as a drilling and spacing unit for gas.28
On March 30, 1977, H&P requested an order nunc pro tunc, trans-
forming the effective date of the order to the date of the hearing on De-
cember 9, 1976.29 The nunc pro tunc order was granted on May 4, 1977,
but was subsequently declared void in 1979 by the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals. 0 Meanwhile, in May of 1977, the unit well was completed as a
producer of oil and gas. 3
Kuykendall then demanded the lease be released because H&P had
not drilled a well on the lease nor was the lease part of a drilling and
spacing unit on the day of expiration.32 H&P countered by filing a quiet
title action which it later dismissed.33 Alleging that the lease held by
H&P was a cloud on the title, Kuykendall filed to quiet his mineral inter-
est. 34 H&P cross-petitioned for a judgment claiming that it held a valid
lease as a result of the unit well's production.35
According to the trial court, commencement and diligent comple-
tion of the proposed section unit well, combined with the pendency of a
spacing application, constituted commencement of drilling under the
lease.36 The trial court further found that Oklahoma law prohibited
H&P from drilling another well in the unit on the Kuykendall premises
while diligently drilling the unit well.37
Using a narrow construction of the commencement of drilling
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. A nune pro tunc entry is an entry presently made to allow acts to be done after the time
when the acts should have been done. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 964 (5th ed. 1979). The spacing
application hearing on December 9, 1976, was within the primary term of the lease.
30. Kuykendall v. Corporation Comm'n, 597 P.2d 1221 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979). Procedural
Rules of the Commission claim orders may be effective on the filing date. Because the date was not
appealed, it thereby became final and was not subject to collateral attack. Id. at 1223. The nunc pro
tunc order was thereby declared invalid for lack of jurisdiction and lack of evidence. Id.
31. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 26.
32. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 870.
33. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 26.
34. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 870.
35. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 26. H&P further claimed that Kuykendalls' interests should
be limited to a 3/16 royalty interest.
36. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 870.
37. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1985)).
[Vol. 23:623
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clause, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding
the primary term was not extended.38 Noting H&P's diligence in ob-
taining a spacing order in the absence of opposition from Kuykendall,
the dissent found a gross imbalance of equities in the majority's deci-
sion. 9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
and held the lease valid.' The court's holding demonstrates that a lessee
will not be held to a narrow interpretation of lease language when the
lessee has demonstrated the intent to develop the unit.
III. BACKGROUND
Since the early 1900's when oil drilling boomed in Oklahoma, the
industry has changed to meet growing demands. To keep pace with
growth and new developments, lease drafters have had to modify lease
language. The concepts of pooling and unitization, which were devel-
oped to maximize production and conserve natural resources, restricted
operations. Consequently, lease language and interpretation were modi-
fied accordingly. In addition, protective language in force majeure
clauses particularly affected judicial determination of compliance with
"commencement of drilling" language.
A. Commencement of Drilling
For a lessee to preserve his rights under the lease, the majority of oil
and gas leases require him to "commence drilling operations" or to
"commence operations for drilling" before the lease term expires. 4 If a
lessee takes action associated with "actual drilling on the premises, in
good faith, and diligently pursues them to completion," most courts find
the lessee has complied with the commencement requirement for keeping
the lease alive.42
38. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 29. See Note, Narrow Construction of Commencement of
Drilling Clause: Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, 19 TULSA L.J. 271 (1983).
39. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 29 (Bacon, J., dissenting).
40. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 871. The court considered three averments of error:
(1) The lease expired for failure to drill on the premises or property spaced therein within
the primary term; (2) H&P was not prohibited from drilling upon the leased premises so as
to excuse its failure to commence; and (3) the Kuykendalls are not barred by laches or
estopped from quieting their title to the premises.
Id. According to the court, it was unnecessary to consider the issues of bar and estoppel in a sum-
mary proceeding ruling.
41. J. LoWE, supra note 22, at 189.
42. Id. at 189-90.
19881
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court has liberally interpreted the com-
mencement clause to include nearly any type of work at the well-site.43
Activities which other state courts have liberally construed to constitute
commencement include: staking the site, cutting rig timbers, and letting
the drilling contract;' digging slush pits;a" moving a drilling rig on site
and starting "rigging up" to spud.46
Arkansas' liberal approach held that a lease was not forfeited by
failure to have a "drill bit pierce the earth"4 7 by the lease deadline. Anal-
ogizing commencement of drilling with baking a cake, the court com-
pared the arguments: "Does 'drilling' commence with the operations for
a well, or does it commence only with the piercing of the ground with the
drill bit? Does 'baking a cake' begin with the preparation of the dough,
or only with the actual placing of the dough in the oven?' 48 By giving
weight to preparation, Arkansas and other state courts encourage devel-
opment and avoid unfairness to lessees who have committed substantial
expenditures.4 9
Although courts generally consider language in the lease to be con-
trolling,50 language is being construed more and more broadly. In 1925,
the Montana Supreme Court distinguished "commencement of drilling
operations" language in the lease from "commencement of operations for
drilling."'" It thereby required actual "spudding in" or the first move-
ment of the drill in penetrating the ground.12 Today, however, courts
seldom distinguish between lease language requiring that the lessee
"commence to drill," "commence drilling operations," or "commence
operations for the drilling of a well."5 3
43. Cases indicating types of activity adequate to constitute commencement include: Burgess v.
Oklahoma Gas Utils. Co., 171 Okla. 294, 295, 42 P.2d 240, 240 (1935) (moving materials onto site
and erecting a derrick); Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okla. 135, 136, 265 P. 647, 648 (1928) (drilling
water well for oil well needs); Cromwell v. Lewis, 98 Okla. 53, 54, 223 P. 671, 672 (1923) (digging
the cellar and transporting timbers to location).
44. Fleming Oil & Gas Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 37 W. Va. 645, -, 17 S.E. 203, 205 (1893).
45. Walton v. Zatkoff, 372 Mich. 491, 127 N.W.2d 365 (1964).
46. Whelan v. Lacy, Inc., 251 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
47. Vickers v. Peaker, 227 Ark. 587, -, 300 S.W.2d 29, 32 (1957).
48. Id.
49. See J. LoWE, supra note 22, at 190.
50. Id.
51. Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 73 Mont. 94, -, 235 P. 761, 763 (1925).
52. Id. at -, 235 P. at 763.
53. 3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW, § 606.1 (1985); Walton v. Zatkoff, 372 Mich. 491, 127
N.W.2d 365 (1964).
[Vol. 23:623
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1. Good Faith Requirement
For a court to consider preliminary activity sufficient to constitute
commencement, the activity must demonstrate good faith. For example,
activity relating to drilling or preparation for drilling may demonstrate
good faith and the intention to proceed diligently with drilling. 4 How-
ever, if courts find no intent for development or find a sham transaction,
commencement will be denied." Courts will not find commencement in
the absence of sufficient evidence to show intent to drill and to produce
oil. When the mere designation of a gas unit by the lessee tied up eight
leases with no apparent intention for further development, a Texas court
terminated the leases for lack of good faith commencement. 6 The Mich-
igan Supreme Court also denied commencement status where the lessee
did not acquire the necessary permit nor execute a drilling contract prior
to the lease deadline.5 In the absence of an enumerated good faith stan-
dard, courts consider the circumstances of the case to determine whether
commencement has occurred.58
2. Due Diligence
For commencement status to be accorded, the lessee must pursue
operations with due diligence until completion. 59 Courts also evaluate
due diligence depending on the circumstances; therefore, drilling prepa-
rations alone are insufficient to constitute commencement when further
efforts are not made toward completion.6" In making the due diligence
determination, courts also consider activities toward completion under-
taken after the lease deadline.6" As a result, if all equipment were re-
moved from the site within weeks after the lease deadline, courts may
infer a lack of due diligence or bad faith by the lessee.62 Thus, for a lease
54. Fast v. Whitney, 26 Wyo. 433, -, 187 P. 192, 199 (1920).
55. J. LOWE, supra note 22, at 191. See Butler v. Nepple, 54 Cal. 2d 589, -, 6 Cal. Rptr. 767,
771, 354 P.2d 239, 242 (1960) (when lessees staked the location, moved equipment and pipe onto the
site then removed the equipment, the court found lack of a bona fide intention to commence
drilling).
56. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Underwood, 558 S.W.2d 509, 512-13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
57. Goble v. Goff, 327 Mich. 549, -, 42 N.W.2d 845, 847 (1950).
58. Courts apply "gastronomic jurisprudence to give effect to the bargain the parties to the
lease made" in deciding whether good faith exists. J. Lowe, supra note 22, at 191.
59. Son-Lin Farms, Inc. v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1, 2 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
60. Herl v. Legleiter, 9 Kan. App. 2d 15, -, 668 P.2d 200, 203 (1983).
61. In Legleiter, drilling preparations did not constitute commencement when the lessee neither
owned a drilling rig nor had one under contract. Yet the court indicated a different result if opera-
tions had continued with due diligence after the lease expired. Id.
62. "An oil and gas lease is governed by different rules of construction from those applicable to
other contracts, being construed most strongly against the lessee and in favor of the lessor." Simon
1988]
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to be extended because the commencement clause has been met, a lessee
must begin preparation for drilling and continue operations after the
lease deadline until the well is completed.
B. Pooling and Unitization
Pooling and unitization allow more flexible lease interpretation
while at the same time creating complexities in lease extension interpreta-
tion. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, "pooling"
means bringing together small tracts of land into a drilling unit or spac-
ing unit of designated size,63 whereas "unitization" is the joint operation
of all or a portion of a producing reservoir.' Pooling prevents physical
and economic waste and protects land owner's correlative rights in a for-
mation by restricting the number of wells to be drilled on a unit.6 5 Pool-
ing also protects the rights of owners of land in a common reservoir from
drainage losses.66 Most significantly in lease analysis, if there is produc-
tion or drilling on the unit, a pooling clause extends the lease beyond its
primary term6 7 even without actual production.6"
Unitization allows an entire field, or a substantial portion of a field,
v. Foster, 373 P.2d 28, 30 (Okla. 1962). Such construction was rationalized because the lessee gener-
ally prepares the lease and contracts are construed against the drafter. See Prowant v. Sealy, 77
Okla. 244, 252, 187 P. 235, 243 (1919); see, e.g., Beatty v. Baxter, 208 Okla. 686, 688, 258 P.2d 626,
628 (1953).
63. 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 901 (1985). The size is designated in
a spacing order granted by a state's Corporation Commission. Id.
64. Id.
65. Waste, as applied to the production of oil, is defined to include "economic waste, under-
ground waste, including water encroachment in the oil or gas bearing strata; ...methods that
unreasonably interfere with obtaining from the common source of supply the largest ultimate recov-
ery of oil; surface waste and waste incident to the production ...." OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 86.2
(1971). Waste of gas includes the "production of gas in such quantities . . . as unreasonably to
reduce reservoir pressure or... to diminish the quantity of oil or gas that might be recovered ......
Id. § 86.3. See Harris, Modification of Corporation Commission Orders Pertaining to a Common
Source ofSupply, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 125, 127-28 (1958) for categorization of oil and gas waste. See
also Harris, at 129-30 for a listing of specific rights constituting the concept of correlative rights.
Harris broadly defines correlative rights as the "interdependent rights of each owner to share in the
benefits of the common source of supply on a fair and equitable basis ..... Id. at 129.
66. Drainage is the "migration of oil or gas in a reservoir due to a pressure reduction caused by
production from wells bottomed in the reservoir." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
TERMS 265 (1987). According to the rule of capture established by early courts, the owner of a well
was recognized as the owner of the oil and gas issuing through his well even though drained from
lands of his neighbors. Reduction to possession constituted ownership. As a result, self-protection
forced each owner of a tract of ground overlaying an oil pool to quickly drill as many wells as
possible and produce to capacity. Accompanying gas was often flared or blown out. Resources and
unnecessary development costs were wasted as drilling was denser than necessary. E. KUNTZ, J.
LOWE, 0. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, OIL AND GAS LAW 54-55 (1986).
67. Primary term currently refers to the period of time, usually five or ten years, during which a
lease may be retained by a lessee even absent production in paying quantities via drilling operations
or the payment of rentals. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 66, at 746.
8
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to be operated as a single entity regardless of surface lines.69 By strategi-
cally locating wells within a unit, reservoir energy use is maximized.7"
Unitization, therefore, results in greater recovery of oil at less cost. Uni-
tization may be either voluntary or compulsory and may be formed
either for exploration or for enhanced recovery.7"
When a leasehold is included in a unit because of a pooling or uni-
tization agreement, the agreement may significantly affect the express or
implied terms of the lease.7" According to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, combining Oklahoma's oil and gas conservation statute with an
Oklahoma Corporation Commission pooling order results in extending
the primary term fixed in an oil and gas lease.73 By allowing production
in paying quantities to keep a leasehold alive after expiration of the pri-
mary term, pooling and unitization affect the "thereafter" lease clause.74
The greatest difficulties arise regarding effects of usage of portions of the
unit other than the specific leased premises, 75 because the leasehold is
kept alive whether production is on the lease in question or on another
portion of the unit.
C. Force Majeure Clause
A force majeure clause is utilized in a lease to prevent the lessee
from losing the lease when circumstances beyond his control prevent ful-
fillment of all the lease conditions and covenants.7 6 The force majeure
68. E. KUNTZ et al, supra note 66, at 198. The following language is typical in a lease: "pro-
duction, drilling or reworking operations anywhere on the unit which includes all or part of this
lease shall be treated as if it were production, drilling, or reworking operations under this lease." Id.
69. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 63 § 901. Economic and property rights mandate
unitization for operations including gas cycling, pressure maintenance, and secondary recovery. Id.
70. Id.
71. Anderson, Mutiny: The Revolt Against Unsuccessful Unit Operations, 30 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. § 13.02, at 13-3 (1984). To conserve the reservoir's natural energy and achieve the
ultimate recovery, unitization at an early stage is ideal. Id. § 13.02, at 13-4. Under voluntary uni-
tization, all of the interest owners in a field, or portion of a field, agree to joint operations to enhance
recovery. However, because consent may not be achievable, there are compulsory unitization acts in
many states to compel unitization. Id. See id. at n.5 for a listing of states with compulsory unitiza-
tion acts. Texas is one of the few oil producing states without a compulsory unitization act.
Oklahoma's act is codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 287.1-.15 (1969). See Kuntz, Statutory Well
Spacing and Drilling Units, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 344 (1978) (effect of regulation of drilling under the
statute on lessors and lessees).
72. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 63, § 950.
73. State ex rel. Comm'r of Land Office v. Carter Oil Co., 336 P.2d 1086 (Okla. 1958) quoted in
Layton v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 383 P.2d 624, 625 (Okla. 1963).
74. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 63, § 953.
75. Id. § 950, at 694.5. Pooling or unitization by a lessee may remove interior boundary lines
between lessees, but the lines still apply to lessors. Therefore, each lease must be protected to create
reasonable development and to prevent drainage.
76. Recent Development, Oil and Gas: Effect of a Spacing Order Filed Before But Issued After
9
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concept provides a legal standard to implement the "doctrine of excuse"
to allow risk allocation and management. 77 The concept of excuse re-
suits from the principle that the risk of a contingency affecting perform-
ance is presumed to rest on the promisor (lessee). 78 As a principle of
equity, force majeure will prevent a court from preserving one party's
rights when a supervening circumstance would place the total burden on
the other party.79
Force majeure encompasses concepts of impossibility, impracticabil-
ity, and frustration of purpose. 0 In addition, force majeure includes ju-
dicial acknowledgement that certain types of governmental and judicial
or administrative action constitute intervention by a superior force suffi-
cient to excuse performance. For example, in a "government action"
case, a Texas court held an oil and gas lease extended where drilling
under the lease was prevented by bankruptcy court intervention.8'
Therefore, a lease will be extended if the lessee demonstrates a good
faith, diligent intent to commence drilling and to pursue operations until
the well is completed. In granting the extension, the court will evaluate
how pooling and unitization affect the leased premises as well as the
rights of the parties. In addition, a force majeure clause will overcome
adverse unavoidable circumstances to preserve the lease.
IV. DECISION
From 1932 forward, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decisions have
promoted oil and gas development.8 2 The court's decision in Kuykendall
exemplifies liberal lease interpretation to foster development. The court
similarly utilized strict construction favoring the lessor when the end
the Expiration of the Primary Term of a Lease Included in the Unit, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 469, 470 n.3
(1983).
77. Kirkham, Force Majeure-Does It Really Work?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 6.02, at
6-1, 6-4 (1984).
78. Id. at 6-5 (citing In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 459 (E.D. Va. 1981)).
79. Id. at 6-7.
80. Id. § 6.03, at 6-10.
81. Gilbert v. Smedley, 612 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); see also Gordon v. Crown Cent.
Petroleum Co., 284 Ark. 94, 679 S.W.2d 192 (1984) (force majeure clause protected the lessee when
his breach of the pooling clause resulted from compliance with government order). But see Webb v.
Hardage Corp., 471, So. 2d 889 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (voluntary bankruptcy filing by original lessee
and sublessee was insufficient to extend the primary term of leases under the force majeure clause
absent evidence that the delay or interruption of development was beyond the lessee's control).
82. See Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932) (lessee evidenced a desire to
develop). "[No] Court has been more favorable to the interests of a lessee, who seeks to perform his
covenants." Id. at 421 (citing Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 188 P. 347 (1920)).
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promoted development. 83 Recognizing the lessee's intent to develop in
Kuykendall, the court considered the lessee's good faith diligent efforts
which were construed by the effect of the unit spacing order. Finding
further support for lease extension in the force majeure clause, the court
found upholding the lease created an equitable result for both parties.
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Commencement Clause and the Lessee's Equity
To keep the lease in effect, the court in Kuykendall essentially ex-
panded the lease's commencement clause to include the "pendency of a
pooling application."84 The drilling clause stated, "If the lessee shall
commence to drill a well .... within the items of this lease .... on
acreage pooled therewith, the lessee shall have the right to drill such well
to completion "8.... 5 When a lease contains such commencement lan-
guage, even if well completion is not accomplished until after the pri-
mary lease term, commencement within the primary term will cause an
automatic extension of a lease.86 The legal effect of the pooling order
would therefore cause commencement of the unit well to constitute
"commencement of drilling" for purposes of the Kuykendall lease87
which was included in the unit.
When drilling has commenced on the sole designated well in a spac-
ing unit, additional drilling is statutorily prohibited88 even if the unit or-
der is still pending. Therefore, in evaluating the circumstances, the court
considered the spacing application's drilling prohibition, commencement
of drilling in the unit's common source of supply, and completion of the
well to production. The combined effect was sufficient to continue the
lease.89
83. Id. at 421 (citing New State Oil and Gas Co. v. Dunn, 75 Okla. 142, 182 P. 514 (1919);
Carder v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okla. 243, 201 P. 252 (1921); Mistletoe Oil & Gas Co. v.
Revelle, 117 Okla. 144, 245 P. 620 (1926)).
84. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27 (1982). According to the appellate court, this liberal con-
struction favoring the lessee is condemned by a long line of cases. Id. (citing Beatty v. Baxter, 208
Okla. 686, 258 P.2d 626 (1953)).
85. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27 (emphasis original).
86. Rein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 400 P.2d 800 (Okla. 1965) (distinguishes lease term requir-
ing commencement rather than completion).
87. See State ex reL Comm'r of Land Office v. Carter Oil Co., 336 P.2d 1086 (Okla. 1958) (lease
is extended past primary term when production from any portion of the pooled acreage satisfies
"thereafter" clause requirements); see also Layton v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 383 P.2d 624 (Okla.
1963) (legal effect of pooling order creates extension past primary lease term).
88. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1988).
89. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 874.
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With the goal of promoting development, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court will assess a lessee's intention to produce by considering the
lessee's good faith efforts,9 0 due diligence,91 and the equitable circum-
stances.92 In determining commencement, the equitable approach has
extended to the areas of assessing discovery of production in paying
quantities and the obligation to market products prudently.93 Courts
have historically taken a subjective approach, granting more leniency to
an operator once he has made a discovery. 94
According to the court in Kuykendall, H&P was drilling into the
unit and had made diligent efforts to secure the unit spacing applica-
tion.95 In addition, at the uncontested hearing, the trial examiner recom-
mended that the spacing order be granted. 96 Although the effective date
of the hearing can be given to spacing orders if the request is made in
advance of the final order,97 it is unclear why H&P failed to do so.98
Hence, they could only wait for the official order. 99
Under the circumstances, H&P was effectively prevented from strict
compliance with the commencement covenants of the lease."t° There-
fore, a contrary decision would have been inequitable to the lessee. 101
Furthermore, within five months after commencement the well was com-
pleted as a producing well.10 2 Completion of the well on the unit was
90. Son-Lin Farms, Inc. v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1 (,V.D. Okla. 1982).
91. See supra notes 42 & 45 and accompanying text.
92. "Oklahoma courts will consider equitable circumstances in determining whether the situa-
tion justifies continuation of the lease." R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.4 (1983).
93. Battle, Lease Maintenance in the Face of Curtailed/Depressed Markets, 32 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. § 14.02 (1986).
94. Id. § 14.05(2).
95. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 870-71.
96. Id. at 870.
97. Primer on Forced Pooling, supra note 22, at 655.
98. After the official spacing order was filed, the Corporation Commission granted H&P a nunc
pro tunc order stating that the hearing date on December 9, 1976, was the effective date of the order.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed the order because of absence in the record of a request for
an effective earlier date either at the hearing or prior to the filing of the unit spacing order on
December 21, 1976. Kuykendall v. Corporation Comm'n, 597 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Okla. Ct. App.
1979). If H&P had requested that the filing date or hearing date be the effective date, the nune pro
tunc order specifying the filing date as the date of the unit order would have been declared valid.
Hair v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 740"P.2d 134, 140-41 (Okla. 1987).
99. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 29 (Bacon, J., dissenting).
100. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 873.
101. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 29 (Bacon, J., dissenting).
102. See supra note 31. Under a strict approach, if the unit order had not been granted by the
day the lease expired or if drilling in the Kuykendall lease had not commenced, the lease would be
terminated.
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sufficient to establish H&P's intent to produce. Therefore, equitable fac-
tors combined with diligent completion sufficiently justified lease exten-
sion even though the lease had technically expired.
B. The Unit Spacing Order and the Lessor's Equity
A state's power to further its interest in conserving its resources is
exercised when a spacing order application is filed under the current sec-
tion 87.1(e) of title 52 of the Oklahoma statutes. 10 3  Under section
87. 1(e), the state's police power effectively suspends the right to drill dur-
ing the pending period."° Recognizing the state's police power, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has continually acknowledged the validity of
statutes granting authority to the Commission"0 5 to regulate oil and gas
production for waste prevention. 106 Hence, at the time a lease, as a con-
tract, is executed, current existing law governs its validity and effect.'1 7
Consequently, the court's interpretation of when "commencement" oc-
curs will be determined in light of the statutory proscription.10 8 Such a
determination will not constitute a due process violation even if the lessor
is thereby precluded from terminating the lease.
The Commission is authorized to assure equitable apportionment of
beneficial oil and gas interests among leasehold owners'09 and to propor-
tionally distribute costs of production."0 These apportionment powers
do not violate due process."' The court in Ward v. Corporation Com-
mission"' found that withdrawal of an owner's right to drill without a
103. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 874. The pertinent portion of OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e)
(Supp. 1988) is as follows:
The drilling of any well or wells into any common source of supply for the purpose of
producing oil or gas therefrom, after a spacing order has been entered by the Commission
covering such common source of supply, at a location other than that fixed by said order is
hereby prohibited. The drilling of any well or wells into a common source of supply, cov-
ered by a pending spacing application, at a location other than that approved by a special
order of the Commission authorizing the drilling of such a well is hereby prohibited ....
104. Id.
105. Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, 327 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1957), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S.
642 (1959); Wakefield v. Oklahoma, 306 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1957); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (Okla. 1950) (cited in Layton v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp., 383 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1963) and in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Long, 406 P.2d 499, 503-04
(Okla. 1965)); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 183 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938), appeal
dismissed, 305 U.S. 376 (1939).
106. Anderson, 327 P.2d at 703-04.
107. Oklahoma Natural Gas, 406 P.2d at 503; Layton, 383 P.2d at 627.
108. The law determinative of the right of the producer is subordinate to the police power of the
state. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 233-34 (1932).
109. Anderson, 327 P.2d at 700.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 703.
112. 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972).
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right to participate in the unit well's proceeds would comprise a taking
without due process. 11 3 Therefore, owners of an interest in the oil and
gas of a spacing unit share in the production of the unit well at the time
the unit is established."
14
Under section 87. 1(e), the right to participate in the unit well arises
when the application is filed with the Commission. I" In the earlier
Wood Oil Co. cases," 6 the court did not require the lessee to account to
the lessor for production before the spacing unit was finalized., 7 The
court in Kuykendall effectively distinguished its analysis by explaining
that the court in Wood Oil Co. II reached its decision under the original
section 87.1(d) which did not prohibit drilling into a pending unit, but
only into a unit with a finalized spacing order."'1 Therefore, because
there was no interference with drilling rights during pendency, due pro-
cess did not mandate participation in production until the spacing order
was final. 19 Because section 87.1(e), which replaced section 87.1(d),
prohibits drilling during the pendency of a spacing application, due pro-
cess requires participation in production of a unit well from the time the
application is filed.'2 °
As the lessor, Kuykendall's due process rights were not violated be-
cause he had a right to participate in the proceeds of the designated unit
well at the time the unit application was filed. Therefore, even though
section 87. 1(e) prohibited drilling an additional well into the Kuykendall
lease, his rights were secured. In fact, the one day delay in obtaining the
spacing order did not injure Kuykendall.' 2 ' H&P was obligated to rec-
ognize Kuykendall's interest in the well even though Kuykendall never
113. Id. at 507. "[O]il and gas lessees and others who own interests in the spacing (drilling) unit,
share in the production of the unit well whether drilled before or after the spacing (drilling) unit is
established as of the time the unit is established." Id.
114. Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 741 P.2d 869, 873 (Okla. 1987). The right to
participate is therefore operative during pendency of the application. Id.
115. Id.
116. Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 268 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1954) (Wood Oil III) and
Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950) (Wood Oil II) (noted in
Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 873-74).
117. Wood Oil Co., 205 Okla. at 539, 239 P.2d at 1026.
118. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 873. The Wood Oil II case was decided under OKLA. STAT. tit.
52, § 87.1(d) (Supp. 1945). In 1947, § 87.1(d) was changed to prohibit drilling into a pending unit.
In 1977, § 87.1(d) became § 87.1(e).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 872-73.
121. See Note, supra note 38, at 277-78, 282-83. The author maintains that at the time H&P
filed the spacing order application, Kuykendall was probably delighted at the possibility of receiving
an interest in McClure No. 1. Id. at 279.
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shared any risk or expense."' Therefore, liberal lease extension equita-bly benefitted both parties to the lease.
C. Force Majeure Clause
The drilling prohibition in section 87.1(e) triggered application of
the force majeure clause in the Kuykendall lease and excused H&P from
strict compliance with the lease terms."'3 The force majeure clause pro-
vided that the lessor could not terminate the lease if compliance was pre-
vented by any rule or regulation. 124 Because the statute prohibits drilling
any well into a pending unit other than the designated well, H&P could
not possibly drill on the Kuykendall lease until the status of the unit was
officially determined.
Justification for the statutory drilling prohibition flows from the
original rationale for implementing unitization and pooling which was
prevention of waste resulting from loss due to drainage.12 When the
Commission establishes that one well will effectively drain a unit, addi-
tional drilling would constitute waste.1 26  The suspension of drilling
rights during pending unit applications is essentially a conservation mea-
sure designed to ultimately further oil and gas development. Therefore,
the court properly rejected the contention that H&P could have met the
terms of the lease by requesting an emergency order to drill a second well
on the Kuykendall lease. 127 An emergency order would probably have
been denied as wasteful.
122. H&P argued that Kuykendall's failure to offer to pay any portion of McClure No. 1 drilling
costs, in light of Kuykendall's extensive knowledge about the situation, constituted "lying behind the
log" or "riding the well down" which are practices disfavored by the court. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA.
B.J. at 28. As noted by H&P, had it been aware the lease would terminate, it could have procured a
lease ratification to enter an agreement with Kuykendall for an equitable apportionment of the risks
regarding McClure No. 1. Id.
123. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 871.
124. The lease held by H&P contained the following force majeure clause:
All express or implied covenants of this lease shall be subject to all Federal and State Laws,
Executive Orders, Rules and Regulations, and this lease shall not be terminated in whole
or in part, nor lessee held liable in damages, for failure to comply therewith, if compliance
is prevented by, or such failure is the result of any such Law, Order, Rule or Regulation.
Id.
125. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text. The court had earlier rationalized lessor-
oriented lease construction by alleging danger of loss of oil and gas through migration toward a
producing well on adjoining land. See Beatty v. Baxter, 208 Okla. 686, 258 P.2d 626 (1953).
126. Kuykendall, 741 P.2d at 872.
127. An emergency order request would have required H&P to contradict its original spacing
order application's contention that one well was sufficient. Id. Unless the case is extreme, the Com-
mission will not make an exception to the rule allowing only one producing well on each spacing
unit. Ward v. Corporation Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503, 507 (Okla. 1972).
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The court's decision to extend the lease by finding drilling had com-
menced, therefore constitutes a valid interpretation of language in the
lease. In summary, H&P demonstrated a good faith intention to produce
and develop, which it pursued with due diligence. Terminating the lease
would have inequitably affected H&P. Upon application for unitization,
Kuykendall received the equitable right to participate in proceeds of the
unit well; therefore, his rights were not adversely affected. Finally, the
force majeure clause excused strict compliance with the lease terms be-
cause of the statutory drilling prohibition in 87.1(e).
D. Future Implications
The Kuykendall decision will reinforce the prevailing trend toward
liberal interpretation of the commencement of drilling clauses. 128 It re-
places the hardship and uncertainty for both lessees and lessors created
by the narrow construction of the appellate decision. 129 If a lessee can
demonstrate good faith, due diligence evidenced by substantial compli-
ance, and the intent to produce evidenced by a completed unit well, the
Oklahoma courts will be inclined to extend the lease.
As lease clauses increase in complexity and both parties become bet-
ter informed, drafters should carefully structure lease clauses. 130 Defin-
ing exactly what will constitute drilling would simplify interpretation
thereby reducing the potential for litigation. The lease should clearly
indicate the expectation of the parties by using an objective standard. 13'
For example, if the lessee wants anything other than drilling to constitute
commencement, he should specify those activities. In addition, the force
majeure clause should be drafted to prevent lease termination due to una-
voidable delays. Conversely, a lessor desiring to test the lessee's sincerity
in developing the property may require a drilling rig on site with the drill
bit actually turning in the ground.' 32
Some possibilities exist for extending an existing lease: (1) negotiat-
ing an agreement with the lessor extending the primary term; (2) taking
128. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
129. See Note, supra note 38, at 290.
130. Kuykendall, 54 OKLA. B.J. at 28. Certainly, modem lease forms suited to the problems
confronting the oil and gas industry in the 1980's should replace old lease forms. See Meyers, supra
note 9, § 17.11 at 17-26.
131. Interview with David E. Pierce, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa
College of Law, and Associate Director of the National Energy Law and Policy Institute (Jan. 29,
1988).
132. Id. A lessor may want the exact status of a lease determinable on the day of expiration if he
wants to immediately sign an agreement with a new lessor or if he has a top lease agreement.
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as many preparatory steps as feasible by the deadline to ensure lease ex-
tension in the event the spacing unit is denied; 13 3 and (3) continuing op-
erations and diligently undertaking actual drilling in good faith. 134 In
addition, a lessee applying for a spacing application within a limited time
frame should request that the effective date of the final order be the date
of filing. Some critics have labeled "relation back" to the filing date a
legal fiction contrary to public policy.135 However, recognized procedure
allows changing the "effective date" if the request is made in advance of
the final order. 136
In summary, the lessee has several options for achieving lease exten-
sion. The lessee can structure the lease to ensure a liberal commence-
ment interpretation. The inclusion of a force majeure clause will protect
against unavoidable delays. Lastly, lessees can proceed with due dili-
gence in continuing operations as well as in procuring a spacing order
within the confines of the lease term.
V. CONCLUSION
In granting a lease extension by finding the "commencement" clause
was satisfied, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rectified an unnecessarily
harsh appellate decision. Using a careful statutory analysis and consider-
ing the overall circumstances, the resulting flexible lease interpretation
will enhance Oklahoma's goal of promoting production and develop-
ment. In view of the depressed oil economy in Oklahoma, judicial deci-
sions promoting development of oil are indeed prudent. The decision
clearly reflects Justice Holmes' view of evolving law as an adaptation to
the felt necessities of the time.
Beverly A. Stewart
133. Drilling preparations should include any of the alternatives mentioned supra notes 43-49
which were held sufficient to constitute drilling. See also Pearce, Problems and Opportunities During
Hard Times in the Minerals Industry, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. 8-1 (1986) (review of the mineral
lessee's obligations and possible ways to keep oil and gas leases alive).
134. Pearce, supra note 133, at 8-13.
135. See Recent Development, supra note 76, at 470.
136. See Primer on Forced Pooling, supra note 22, at 655; see supra notes 97 & 98 and accompa-
nying text.
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